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RELIGIOUS EXPLANATIONS: A REPLY 
TO ERN AN McMULLIN 
Edward L. Schoen 
In his review of my Religious Explanations, I Professor McMullin has been kind 
enough to offer a concise summary of his interpretation of the basic structure of 
my argument. He also has been willing to suggest a rather extended series of 
objections to my work. Needless to say, his provocative comments have proven 
to be immensely stimulating to me and for this I am deeply grateful. 
Several of the criticisms offered by Professor McMullin focus on central 
aspects of the main line of argument presented in Religious Explanations. Though 
one might quibble over whether these objections impact upon the argument at 
precisely the places or in the particular ways claimed by Professor McMullin, 
it must be conceded that, if successful, they would demonstrate serious shortcom-
ings in certain aspects of my work. Of particular interest are his comments about 
explanatory overdetermination, anthropomorphism and the epistemic status of 
nonepistemic reasons. About each of these matters I would like to make a few 
very brief comments. 
Regarding my example of a clock with two separate mechanisms, each of 
which is sufficient to account for the motion of the clock's hands, Professor 
McMullin protests, 
Either mechanism, in the abstract, could cause the motion. But only 
one at any given time actually does. If we want to explain the actual 
motion of the hands of the clock, we have to press further and ask 
which mechanism is in fact responsible for it. The two explanatory 
hypotheses are rivals here; though either (until the clock is opened) 
could explain the motion, only one is correct. And opening the clock 
will enable us to tell which. So this analogy will not serve to validate 
the non-rivalist approach to religious explanation. 2 
There is reason to doubt that Professor McMullin is correct on this point, 
however. Consider the clock more concretely. Suppose it takes a force of between 
five and fifteen foot-pounds to shove the lever driving the hands one notch. With 
less than five foot-pounds of force, the lever fails to move. More than fifteen 
pushes it two notches instead of just one. Furthermore, suppose the lever must 
be shoved one notch per second for the hands to move properly. Of course, a gear 
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mechanism could be designed quite easily to hit the lever at one second intervals 
with five foot-pounds of force. If this mechanism were put in place, its operation 
would account for the movement of the hands on the clock. Given this setup, 
what is to prohibit the introduction of a second mechanism, one that is syn-
chronized with the first and designed to hit the lever with an additional five 
foot-pounds of force? Would the first stop operating just because the second had 
been introduced? Of course not. Each would strike with sufficient force to move 
the lever. Acting together, they would strike with more than sufficient force. 
Putting the point more generally, explanatory overdetermination requires 
nothing more than the simultaneous occurrence of more than one set of sufficient 
conditions. Far from being a "creative inspiration," as Professor McMullin 
suggests, explanatory overdetermination is commonplace. Kids slam drawers 
shut with two hands, when one would do just fine. Shopkeepers spring into 
action because they have been alerted both by blinking lights and, simultaneously, 
by separate, independent systems of wailing sirens. Visitors shiver in frustration 
on doorsteps because their passage is blocked by several locks, anyone of which 
is husky enough to bar entry. 
On p. 303 of his review, Professor McMullin charges my position with an un-
acceptable anthropomorphism. As I understand him, the source of this anthro-
pomorphism lies in the fact htat the use of models in Religious Explanations 
eventuates in certain properties being predicated univocally of both God and 
human beings. 
This seems a rather slim basis upon which to ground such a charge. After all, 
univocal predication alone is insufficient to guarantee anthropomorphism. 
Although ' ... is a thing' is univocally predicable of both people and chairs, 
this does not lead to the conclusion that our conception of chairs is anthropomor-
phic. ' ... feels pain' and' ... cares for its young' are univocally predicable 
of both people and lions. In itself, this fact does not serve to precipitate 
anthropomorphic conceptions of lions. 
Anthropomorphism results not from univocal predication as such, but from 
the attempt to attribute distinctively human traits to nonhumans. According to 
certain traditional schools of thought, God is a person, but not a human person. 
On this view, the trick to avoiding anthropomorphism in the use of human models 
is to find a way of carrying the "person" characteristics over to the divine case 
while leaving behind the human elements. This is what the elaborate process of 
refinement discussed in Chapter IV of Religious Explanations is all about. 
On p. 308 of his review, Professor McMullin worries over my contention 
that nonepistemic reasons may provide a basis for accepting certain nonrivalist 
religious explanations. He notes that" ... a non-epistemic reason (once again, 
by definition) gives one no reason to believe that the claim in question is 
true ... It cannot serve to make the explanation resting on it more plausible, 
312 Faith and Philosophy 
since plausibility is truth-related" (p. 308). 
Although Professor McMullin does not specify the exact relationship he envi-
sions between plausibility and truth, his complaint seems to rest upon the convic-
tion that genuinely nonepistemic reasons for accepting explanations do not make 
such explanations more likely to be true. Nonepistemic reasons, being nonepis-
temic, cannot be used to determine the epistemic warrant of religious explana-
tions. While this may be correct, perhaps even definitionally so, it remains utterly 
irrelevant to the issue at hand. In order to see this irrelevance, one must distinguish 
reasons that affect estimations regarding the likelihood that an explanation is 
true from reasons for accepting that explanation as true. As would be expected, 
these two classes of reasons overlap considerably. But they are not identical. 
Consider the nonrivalist situation to which Professor McMullin refers. Theorists 
are faced with a range of data for which both a religious and a scientific explanation 
can account. Being nonrivalist, the truth of one of the two suggested explanations 
does not preclude the truth of the other. Furthermore, since both explanations 
can account for the range of data in question, they must both be either properly 
formulated or capable of proper formulation. Since any explanation that is capable 
of proper formulation reaches the level of initial plausibility, both explanations 
must be initially plausible. 
Of course, since any number of absurd explanations may be capable of proper 
formulation, initial plausibility is a very minimal level of epistemic warrant. In 
fact, initial plausibility alone almost never provides a sufficient basis for accepting 
an explanation, religious or otherwise. Nevertheless, it does provide at least 
some degree of epistemic warrant. After all, explanations capable of being 
properly formulated are epistemically superior to explanations that cannot be so 
formulated. 
In this particular instance, it would be natural to assume that the scientific 
explanation possesses greater, probably much greater, epistemic warrant than 
the religious account. Thus, if the two were in conflict, theorists would do well 
to abandon their religious explanation in favor of the stronger scientific one. But 
since this is a nonrivalist case, the two accounts are not in conflict. Therefore, 
the religious explanation retains whatever minimal epistemic warrant it possesses 
in virtue of its proper formulation. 
It is at this point that nonepistemic considerations come into play. If appropriate 
nonepistemic reasons could be found, they would provide a basis for accepting 
the religious explanation in spite of the fact that the scientific account was 
explanatorily sufficient. That is, they would provide a basis for accepting a 
religious explanation for which there was some epistemic warrant, but not enough 
to warrant acceptance on explanatory grounds alone. Such nonepistemic reasons 
would provide reasons for accepting the religious explanation as plausible or 
even as true without making that explanation more likely to be true. 
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A surprising number of the remaining comments offered by Professor McMullin 
appear to rest upon various misapprehensions. Because of this, very little would 
be accomplished by addressing the balance of his criticisms directly. Instead, 
attention must be turned to the various misconceptions underlying them. In this 
move toward a consideration of fundamental misunderstandings, the most useful 
approach would seem to be to eschew piecemeal reactions in favor of a more 
systematic attempt to place Religious Explanations in its proper setting. 
From the outset, the self-imposed limitations of Religious Explanations must 
be kept clearly in mind. First of all, out of the diversity of explanatory structures 
available, only one was chosen for discussion. This left open the possibility that 
other appropriate explanatory structures, perhaps even more important ones, 
might be used for constructing religious explanations. Far from prohibiting the 
formulation of religious explanations along radically nonscientific lines, a sugges-
tion offered by Professor MuMullin on pp. 307-308, the door was left wide open 
for them. 
Second, for the purposes of this work, relatively early versions of the positions 
of Thomas Kuhn and Larry Laudan were selected to provide guidelines for 
assessing the plausibility of explanations. Neither position was criticized in the 
book. For that matter, neither position was the best that Kuhn or Laudan has to 
offer. These particular views were selected because they represent widely influen-
tial, significant, contemporary theories, not because I believed them to be correct. 
Indeed, given the fact that they are incompatible with each other, they could not 
possibly both be correct. 
Third, two quite distinct lines of skeptical attack were considered, both of 
which spring from reflection upon the structure and progress of the sciences. 
One line involved skepticism of the cognitive intelligibility of religious discourse 
while the other was skeptical of the truth of religious claims. Given these lines 
of criticism, one form of response, suggested by Professor McMullin on pp. 300-
301, is certainly worthy of pursuit. It would involve the repudiation of scien-
tifically based standards. This was not the course I selected to follow, however. 
Instead, I chose to explore the possibilities for religious belief when forced to 
conform to scientifically inspired strictures. Though less popular than Professor 
McMullin's approach, I believe it to be a remarkably fruitful one, well worthy 
of much fuller exploration. 
When considering religious explanations, I tried to keep questions of cognitive 
intelligibility clearly separated from questions of truth. I argued that any properly 
formulated religious explanation could claim cognitive intelligibility simply by 
conforming to the standards of initial plausibility. Explanations that could go on 
to meet the additional criteria for plausibility specified by Kuhn or Laudan would 
have to be judged worthy of acceptance, or at least worthy of pursuit, by anyone 
convinced of the suitability of such standards. Unfortunately, in his failure to 
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keep these two lines apart, Professor McMullin often misconstrues my argumen-
tative intentions. At one point he even suggests that I take the absurd position 
of holding that religious explanations would be judged fully plausible simply by 
conforming to initial plausibility constraints. He writes, "Schoen appears to think 
that it is sufficient for him to show only the 'initial plausibility' of his religious 
explanations" (p. 30 I). 
Finally, given all of these self-imposed limitations on the argument presented 
in Religious Explanations, it should be clear that this book was not designed to 
validate belief in God by appeal to the explanatory power of theism. To argue 
that there is no philosophical or scientific reason to prohibit the pursuit or 
acceptance of certain religious explanations is not to argue that religious expla-
nations can provide an epistemic foundation for religious belief. It is not even 
to argue that such explanations can stand in epistemic isolation. According to 
the argument spanning Chapters V and VI, it is perfectly possible that certain 
religious explanations might depend for the bulk of their support upon conne:ctions 
with other, more thoroughly grounded religious truth claims, claims that may 
have no explanatory pretensions whatever. 
This does not leave the pursuit of plausible religious explanations without 
point, however. If the argument in Religious Explanations is substantially correct, 
a way is opened for expanding and developing characterizations of the divine. 
A method for developing explanatory interpretations for various aspects of human 
life is also provided. For those who have felt constrained to abandon traditional 
Christian views of God while still clinging to some form of religious belief, a 
starting point for reconceiving God is made available. It might even be possible 
for religious explanations to provide some measure of epistemic sustenance 
during periods of religious doubt. 
Western Kentucky University 
NOTES 
1. See Ernan McMullin, "Schoen on Religious Explanation," Faith and Philosophy . .. Professor 
McMullin's review concentrates on the argument in Edward L. Schoen, Religious Explanations: A 
Modelfrom the Sciences (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985). 
2. McMullin, p. 307. Since all subsequent reference to Professor McMullin's work will be to this 
same piece, appropriate page reference in the text will be substituted for more formal citations. I 
would also like to acknowledge my gratitude to Michael Seidler and Ronald Veenker. Both offered 
helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
